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Abstract 
Few studies have examined the implementation and evolution development of a 
contract as a learning process for the actors involved. Individual farmers in São 
Tomé were obliged to organise themselves into a collective in response to a 
chocolate manufacturer’s innovative proposal of an organic cocoa, fair trade 
contract. This relational construction between actors is a basis and guarantee of the 
contract’s durability. We analyse how the relationship between the manufacturer 
and the farmers evolved, the technical and organisational impact on the farmers, 
and the farmers’ future perspectives. Our aim is to further understanding of 
whether the establishment of such a collective cocoa contract may be a means of 
achieving autonomy. In other words, we explore whether it presents an answer to 
the question of producer emancipation. 
Keywords: cocoa, community, emancipation, farmers’ organisation, innovation, 
learning process, partnership, São Tome 
 
1.0  Introduction 
Cocoa was introduced to São Tomé by Portuguese settlers at the end of the 19
th
 
century. By the beginning of the 20
th
 century, São Tomé rapidly had become the 
world’s largest exporter of cocoa. The island became known as "Chocolate Island", 
and the owners of the large cocoa plantations imposed onerous conditions on farm 
workers. Over the years that followed, production regularly diminished. Since 
independence, cocoa production has stagnated at a low level despite heavy 
investments by international organizations to revive the crop (PNUD, 2002). 
Attempts by various governments to diversify agriculture also have failed (Frynas, 
Wood, & Soares de Oliveira. 2003). Cacao continues to be a market monocrop, the 
economic viability of which is no longer certain, and São Tomé must import 
between 75 and 80% of its food needs (ADB, 2009). 
One of these rural renewal projects was launched in 1999 by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFDA) and local authorities. This family farm 
support program (PAPAFPA) aims to coordinate projects seeking to bolster the 
particularly low incomes of small farmers (IFDA, 2010). These projects largely 
have focused on the production and export of cocoa produced by small farmers. 
They also have focused on the expansion of vegetables, fruits and cereals, the 
production of which remains insufficient to meet local consumption needs. 
This was the context in which IFDA solicited the intervention of a French 
chocolate manufacturer specialized in high quality, aromatic cacao. This 
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manufacturer wished to broaden his supply sources, and sought unique quality 
cacao produced through organic agriculture. To guarantee a steady supply of 
quality cocoa, he only wished to work with farmer’s collectives. The manufacturer 
required that post-harvest work be collective, and undertaken in community 
infrastructure. Lastly, the manufacturer set down his requirements in an equitable 
contract he intended to sign with interested cooperatives. Respect of the contract 
terms was expected to be verified by the member communities and by their 
cooperative. The Organic Cacao Export Cooperative (Cooperativa de Exportação 
do Cacau Biológico, CECAB) was created in response to the manufacturer’s 
proposal. CECAB coordinates the communities who join the cooperative, and is 
managed by delegates elected by each of the member communities.  
The aim of this research was to understand the action taken in 2005, consciously 
motivated or not, by the producers and their organizations to engage in a contract 
with the manufacturer. This contract set down the rights and responsibilities of 
every party involved. Our hypothesis is that the sustainability of the contract 
depends on both the technical and organizational capacity of cooperative members 
to meet the manufacturer’s needs, and on the capacity of members to negotiate 
changes in the terms of the contract.   
We met with numerous actors in the agriculture world with links to the cacao 
sector (see Box 1). We analysed their perceptions and practices to understand how 
they have oriented, and currently orient, their manner of proceeding and organizing 
(Roussiau & Bonardi, 2001). First, we rapidly retrace the history of cacao and its 
socio-economic organization in São Tomé. We then demonstrate how the 
development of a contract between the manufacturer and the cooperative reflected 
technical and organizational requirements. Lastly, we raise the question of whether 
these contractual learning processes can bring greater autonomy to producers. 
Box 1: Actors Interviewed 
We interviewed various actors involved in production and management of cacao, 
including the chocolate manufacturer and others involved in research and development 
programs. They were interviewed at their place of work. These interviews, individual and 
collective, were conducted in a semi-comprehensive mode (Kaufmann, 2007). For the 
farmers, the interviews focused on their personal and collective history, their actual 
operations and their future expectations. Twenty-five surveys were conducted: 
 4 groups of farmers, of which 2 were from communities of the Cooperativa de 
Exportação do Cacau Biológico (CECAB); 
 10 individual farmers, of which 5 producers were from CECAB communities (3 
farmers and 2 delegates); 
 the CECAB management team (4); 
 the technical and commercial coordinator of CECAB; 
 the director of the Programa de Apoio Participativo à Agricultura Familiar e Pesca 
Artesanal (Papafpa); 
 1 technician from Papafpa; 
 a non-governmental community support organization; 
 3 research scientists: 1 French and 2 Sao tomenses from the Centro de Investigação 
Agronómica e Tecnológica (CIAT); 
 a group of 3 researchers from Ciat; 
 a group of Ciat (3) and Papafpa (2) managers; 
 the chocolate manufacturer. 
Dulcire 
Journal of Rural and Community Development 7, 2 (2012) 131–141 133 
 
2.0  From Farm Worker to Individual Farmer: A Long Path 
When slavery was abolished in 1876, São Tomé slaves became plantation farm 
workers. They nevertheless remained under the social and economic domination of 
the plantation owners (Temudo, 2008). The social system of the massive 
plantations was based on outlying settlements, known as roças, where 
“communities” of workers and their families were grouped. These communities 
were completely in the hands of plantation owners; each family received a very 
low salary and market gardening was forbidden up until 1966 (Valbert, 1990). 
In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, cacao was cultivated extensively by 
Portuguese colonialists at the expense of coffee and food crops. Between 1910 and 
1920, São Tomé was the world’s largest exporter of cacao, with annual production 
exceeding 30,000 tons. Production then fell rapidly to 10,000 tons following a drop 
in prices induced by overproduction worldwide. Cacao from the “Chocolate 
Island” was considered to have fine organoleptic qualities. Since independence, 
production has stagnated between 2000 and 4000 tons (Dulcire & Roche, 2007). 
When São Tomé became independent, 29 large colonial plantations occupied most 
of the arable land on the island (93%, PNUD, 2002), primarily producing cacao 
(id.). The plantations were nationalized and converted into 15 state farms. The 
plantation workers, who then became government employees, remained salaried 
farm workers. Cacao continued to be the dominant crop. Beginning in 1990, a 
change in government initiated a progressive redistribution of land: small areas 
were distributed to community members while medium and large surface areas 
were distributed to firms. Individual allocations of land were made community by 
community. Former farm workers benefited as well as other citizens (Gründ, 
2006), with all of these beneficiaries thus becoming farmers. 
The lots allocated varied greatly, creating differentiation in terms of farm characteristics. 
The allocation of former colonial community housing was carried out in the same 
manner as the land. It is estimated that 45% of the beneficiaries do not live in the same 
community in which they own a field. These land allocations did not constitute real land 
reform. They were not accompanied by the construction of basic infrastructure to 
improve rural living conditions, a failure which Temudo (2008) qualifies as an act of 
government irresponsibility. This social service failure accentuated the withdrawn 
attitude of these former farm workers turned individual farmers. 
Despite this individual allocation of fields, the cacao trade remains in the hands of five 
exporters. They own the post-harvest processing infrastructure and purchase fresh 
cacao from small farmers, thereby impeding the latter from learning more about the 
sector. The purchase price is low, and does not take quality into account. The cacao 
mainly is used to produce butter. Curiously, however, the first “International Cacao 
Agreement” (UN, 1972) classed São Tomé within a small group of “producing 
countries exporting fine or flavour cacao”: the island still remains part of this group, 
although numerous countries since have been excluded (UN, 2010). 
The production techniques used on the island have changed little since cacao was first 
introduced (Frynas et al., 2003). Recent research on genetic improvement has not had 
an impact on production (Aguilar, 1997) in terms of either quantity or quality. Yields 
remain very low, at approximately 150 kg/ha, due to the age of the plantations and 
because numerous producers collect their cacao only to retain property rights over the 
field. Only easy to access surface areas are now cultivated (PNUD, 2002). 
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3.0  The Establishment of a Manufacturer-Cooperative Contract: 
Negociation or Imposition? 
When interviewed, members of the first communities recruited by the 
manufacturer in 2005 announced that their initial, base objective was an immediate 
increase in income. The collective actor, CECAB, or, in other words, the elected 
representatives of the communities, noted the difficulty of finding a system, a 
sector to sustainably improve the sale price of cacao that would not require 
significant changes in customs and habits. 
The manufacturer sought to diversify his cacao and guarantee a steady supply of 
quality beans. In order to ensure a viable agreement, he demanded that the 
cooperative sign the contract. For this to be possible, the contract had to be accepted 
unequivocally by the 11 communities that then constituted the cooperative, and thus 
by the producers. The manufacturer also required that these stakeholders respond to 
and propose improvements in the contract. He consequently was requesting an 
organization dynamic. This dynamic meant here the collective construction of a 
certain quality of cacao, in response to the manufacturer’s explicit requirements, and 
managing the export of this cacao to France (Table 2). 
A quality approach, regardless of how it is recognized, involves strict conditions: 
the identification of products by the manufacturer and consumers, the voluntary 
engagement of producers, and the respect and verification of technical 
specifications. Beyond a historical, technical, and even unique pedoclimatic profile 
(Dulcire, 2005), this unique quality approach is part of a joint development process 
conducted by producers and the purchasing manufacturer. However, the 
reconstruction of a unique quality (Salette, 1997) cannot alone transform a 
traditional crop into a robust activity from an economic, social or technical 
perspective. As Flichy (2007) demonstrated, dynamic agriculture cannot rely on 
simply reproducing the past: it must innovate, in the socio-technical and 
organizational sense of the word. 
Such innovation is based here on both community and individual initiatives, 
including those undertaken by elected members of CECAB. The transformation of 
their governance dynamics (Rey-Valette, Lardon, & Chia, 2008) represents a 
fundamental challenge in terms of the confidence and operational coordination of 
stakeholders. Lastly, this ensemble of small groups, as requested by the 
manufacturer, have a coordinated activity, a “creative learning process” (Hillier, 
Moulaert, & Nussbaumer, 2004) that is more effective than that of a large, 
centrally organized pyramid group.  
Table 1. Evolution of the member communities, cultivated areas, and exported tons 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Member communities  11 20 33 33 40 49 
Member farmers 372  733 1253 1253 1525 1900 
Surface areas of cacao (ha) 780 1790 2235 2235 2914 4100 
Tons exported 67 130 216 327 478 600 
 
Dulcire 
Journal of Rural and Community Development 7, 2 (2012) 131–141 135 
 
The manufacturer signed the contract with CECAB, which in 2010 regrouped 49 
communities (Table 1). This five-year contract specifies the qualities of the cacao to 
be produced, and lays down the rights and responsibilities that must be respected by 
the two signatories, i.e. the manufacturer and CECAB. CECAB thus is vouching for 
the communities that they will respect these rights and responsibilities (Table 2). The 
terms of the contract shows the manufacturer’s desire to not abuse his dominant 
position. Numerous financial aids recompense the supplementary efforts needed to 
respect the rules: in particular, the sale price for producers, guaranteed to be above 
that of the local market, and the provision of technical and economic support 
processes (Table 2). When asked, producers unanimously approved the terms of the 
contract, saying they gradually had come to understand the advantages for 
themselves, as this buyer was different from others. They said that due to their low 
level of education, their written signature was based on confidence, and on a verbal 
commitment given at that time, sealed by the traditional handshake.  
However, these farmers initially did not understand that their active participation 
was expected over the entire contract period. Respect of the technical 
specifications was not something that simply could be asserted, it was to be 
certified: a certification carried out through internal and collective self-supervision, 
in addition to external supervision. The surveys demonstrate that producers have 
not completely assimilated these specifications. Producers fell back on their 
defensive routines (Argyris & Schön, 1996), resisting the functional change 
induced by the contract, particularly the collective activities: post-harvest, 
community infrastructure, quality control, etc. These new farmers affirm they have 
followed the instructions and thus, paradoxically, have “acted like farm workers” 
under contractual constraints. Implicitly, it is the high purchase price that 
motivated and recompensed the respect of these external rules. The other 
advantages (Table 2) were only cited by certain delegates. 
Table 2. Some Specifications of the 3 Parties Involved 
Manufacturer 
= the buyer 
CECAB 
= the cooperative, the seller 
Communities 
= the producers 
Cost of certification. Coordination of elected 
officials of communities. 
Collective post-harvest 
work (fermentation, 
drying, grading). 
Financing technical and 
management support. 
Verification that contract 
rules are respected. 
Internal quality control and 
traceability. 
Pre-financing acquisitions, 
without interest. 
Collection from communities 
and shipment to France. 
Packing and labelling 
cacao in sacks. 
Financial support for 
infrastructure. 
Management of product and 
cash flows. 
Active participation in 
infrastructure. 
Minimum price guaranteed, 
above world rates. 
Payment to communities. Payment to cacao 
producers. 
 
Individuals who were not farmers and institutions interviewed on site also were full of 
praise for the contract between CECAB and the manufacturer. However, none had any 
modifications to suggest, evoking a lack of mastery and/or absence of alternatives. 
The weak elements result here from the absence of a collective technical know-
how and from the mode of effective participation of producers in the management 
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of their member communities and of the cooperative. During interviews, they did 
not explicitly express a lack of consensus regarding features of the contract or the 
overall joint construction of references in response to the manufacturer’s demands. 
The technical and organisational translation (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthes, 2009) 
of this industrial demand, submitted to the producers, was monopolized by the 
manufacturer due to the lack of an active response. 
The action asked of them as a group was to assume, for their first time in their lives, 
responsibility for their certified cacao. However, their manner reveals an instinctive 
block: the difficulty of coordinating or of working together due notably to their recent 
history as colonial and then state employees. The producers’ direct management of all 
stages in the marketing chain, including exportation, was a condition of the contract. 
This management mode guarantees a “fair” distribution of the value added created and 
an effective increase of income, all the while contributing to a joint discussion of the 
future. However, the revival of the patrimonial symbol of cacao was not enough to 
reawaken a cultural and collective identity.  
4.0  Required to Organise, But Resigned 
The collective activity of producers, in each community and through the 
cooperative, is required under the contract. The collective ties produced by the 
contract reduce hesitation, risk and incertitude. However, the contract also requires 
producers to abandon their former practices of individually producing mediocre 
quality cacao sold fresh. 
4.1 Individual and Collective Learning 
Respect of the contract requires a certain dynamism and efficiency, in individual 
decision making up to the social construction of collective decisions. It requires the 
construction of a coordination framework to manage rules and ensure smooth 
coordination between the farmers, their communities, and the manufacturer. 
Respect of this contract thus requires all of these actors to carry out a "joint 
analysis" (Sydorovych & Wossink, 2008), a representation shared by the producers 
and the manufacturer. These obligations, which ensue from the contract, lead one 
to ponder how the cooperative may function for this action to benefit producers 
and not just their delegates. 
First, this forced learning of working in coordination to carry out activities reflects 
the technical and decisional changes required not only of the individual, but also of 
the collective. Community members need to learn to work together for individual 
and social autonomy (Moity-Maïzi, 2010), but not, as Touraine noted (1988), for 
independence. These learning processes gradually structure the capacity of the 
actors, the farmers, to communicate, both verbally and in writing (Fixmer & 
Brassac, 2004). To act together means they must first adapt themselves, and then 
respond to, the conditions for a “democratic rationalisation of the technical codes” 
(Feenberg, 1999, p. 147) which were imposed by the manufacturer. The collective 
construction of a cacao quality thus also involves developing and appropriating 
know-how, and learning to become autonomous. 
De Koning and de Steenhuijsen (2009) affirm that the farmers must become 
“shareholders” in an enterprise if they wish to effectively participate alongside it. 
Here, the cooperative and the organised communities only are "stakeholders", 
partners of the manufacturer. However, they have a right, that of playing on the 
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dynamic of the terms and conditions of the contract. This contract reduces 
transaction costs, but also provides a guaranteed price, facilitates credit, and 
commits the manufacturer to reinvest part of his profits in the collective 
infrastructure (see Table 2). The organisational confidence (Chia & Torre, 1999) 
created is a fundamental element in the sustainability of the industry: founded on 
the sharing of know-how and information, and on mutual recognition, this 
confidence authorizes group action, in particular the collective mastery of 
uncertainty (Dulcire, 2005), which is the basis of the contract between the 
cooperative and the manufacturer. Communication between these stakeholders in 
this “multidirectional dialogue” (Romanow & Bruce, 2006, p. 146) is a necessary 
condition for the contract to operationally endure. 
The contract also has undeniable economic advantages, not only for the producers' 
purchasing power, but also for the control of risk linked to fluctuations in international 
cacao prices. The interview respondents confirmed that this price guarantee was a 
major advantage. None declared a desire to withdraw from the contract despite having 
had serious doubts during the first years. However, the conditions of the contract 
oblige them to participate together in all stages of the process: post-harvest work and 
the joint development of specifications with the industrialist, and thus organizational 
practices oriented around the achievement of results. Such learning linked to the actual 
management of a process (Argyris et al., 2002) contributes to improving the capacity 
of various stakeholders to adapt. When analyzing the success of agro-alimentary 
initiatives, Constance (2008) particularly noted the importance of these collective 
learning processes, which he describes as emancipating for stakeholders. This required, 
cooperative manner of operating provoked a shock, and then a stirring of awareness, 
among these new producers, who previously never had experienced an opportunity to 
take the initiative. Spontaneously, they denied that there was a way to work as a group, 
while preserving their personal interests, or that collective management could help a 
producer make decisions. They thereby demonstrated that they had not yet 
appropriated the rules of the game. They had not understood, through either ignorance 
or a difficulty in comprehension, that their participation was part of the contract. The 
producers continued to perceive such a social and technical commitment as a 
constraint. Some, however, now have grasped that their participation is a learning 
process, a social and economic asset aimed at sustainably valorising their cacao, and 
therefore of reinforcing the role of the crop in the local economy. 
A comparison with cacao farmers of Ecuador who signed the same type of contract 
with the manufacturer struck us as interesting. These professional farmers, who are 
not new to the profession like those in São Tomé, nevertheless were subjected to the 
same requirements of the manufacturer at the beginning of the contract (Dulcire, 
2010). A number then responded to these requirements, resulting in an active 
collaboration. These farmers were innovation pilots in their cooperative, and rapidly 
brought changes to the contract through a steady process of proposition, negotiation, 
and validation, or, in other words, a joint construction process with the manufacturer. 
4.2.  Participation Stimulated by the Manufacturer, Yet 
Simulated by the Farmers 
CECAB farmers paint an idealistic and positive portrait of the progressive 
development of the industry. This image shows their satisfaction in having 
“participated” in this complex business, an activity that they had not imagined 
possible several years previously. They also describe direct, positive consequences, 
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such as the improvements in their communities’ living conditions, housing, health, 
education, training, etc, and their social and cultural recognition at the national level. 
It was in effect only twenty years ago that the statute of small cacao producer came 
into being, replacing their former status as forced farm labourers and then state 
farm employees. Individually, these new producers nevertheless remained subject 
to the five large local buyers. The awakening of the CECAB producers’ awareness, 
who have for the first time in their history succeeded in exporting their cacao 
themselves, is a real step forward in this country. This stratum of organized 
producers has earned the attention of rural development programs as a model. 
They therefore have benefited easily from the programs’ financial support. Yet 
were the benefits obtained at the expense of other communities? Furthermore, the 
exclusion of individuals, and indeed communities, incapable of respecting the 
specifications of the manufacturer-CECAB shocked the spirit of solidarity of some 
respondents. The difference between the CECAB farmers and those of the 
traditional sector also is seen in the time spent working at the community level: in 
the post-harvest processing of cacao; attending meetings and training sessions, 
participating in the development of infrastructure, and involving themselves in, and 
undergoing, internal and external quality controls. According to them, this 
represents six days of work per month, but more for the community delegates who 
are responsible for the cooperative operations of CECAB. 
Due as much to their new status as individual farmers as to a lack of a tradition of 
collective farmer organizations, the farmers who are members of CECAB were and 
remain reticent with regards to collective operations. Our survey highlighted that 
regular coordination, stimulated by the manufacturer, did not really work. The 
producers did not acknowledge, or did not want to acknowledge, that their 
effective participation was necessary or obligatory. Their elected delegates, as well 
as outside stakeholders (Box 1), identified other major, limiting factors: the level 
of education; the lack of autonomy because the producers were accustomed in the 
past to being given orders; and a consequent difficulty to negotiate and construct 
projects, individually or collectively. 
Constraints, both technical and organizational, thus have been interiorized by these 
producers, and they do not engage actively in the undertaking. They do not form a 
homogenous group, with differences particularly between the managers who are 
elected and the member farmers who they direct. Conforming to the rules of action 
laid down in the contract remained for many a passive, simulated agreement with 
the required social and technical innovations. The “new partnership governance” 
(Jean & Bisson, 2008) hoped for by the manufacturer to obtain a jointly 
constructed type of cacao had trouble getting off the ground. The process was 
conducted by the manufacturer alone, despite his desire for a functional alliance. 
This dependence did not enable a significant reinforcement of social cohesion in 
the communities, an essential factor for the sustainability of change. 
Such a necessary collective empowerment has to be considered “as a social change 
rather than stability” (Drury & Reicher, 2005, p. 52). The participatory approach 
represented from the start a crucial challenge for the sustainable cooperation 
between the stakeholders of this contract. Their mutual recognition means that the 
producers, their associations, and the manufacturer are engaged in a process of 
translation (Callon et al., 2009) to reinforce the essential factor of reciprocal 
confidence (Busch, 2010), and to gradually change the specifications of the 
contract. From this moment on, there is both a contractual reality as well as a 
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cultural one. Each must become capable of producing the same discourse; while 
they may use their own terms, they nevertheless should be capable of expressing 
what pertains not only to their specific status but also to that of others in relation to 
the cacao product. This “contemporary creativity” (Rausch, 2009) is in the process 
of being born, and it cannot draw from São Tomé history. It is sketched out around 
the need to reinforce and to share knowledge and know-how. It also raises the 
question of the role of the framework pre-established by the manufacturer, which 
is one of unique cacao and “organic-fair trade”, used to construct a joint project; in 
other words, the cooperation, understanding, and interactions that are feasible 
between the enterprise and producers, as a group with a common culture. 
5.0  Towards an Emancipation of the Producer? 
The establishment of this certified organic cacao industry in São Tomé led to the 
production of a cacao with a special territorial character and a refined organoleptic 
quality. The contract gave new farmers, who formerly were salaried workers, an 
opportunity, for the first time, to produce and directly sell their cacao. The study 
highlights numerous positive socio-economic effects. However, while the chocolate 
manufacturer required the producers to manage the production, processing, and 
exportation together, the process was not built on the participatory basis sought for 
by the manufacturer. At the start, there was no active involvement on the part of 
farmers, and they later remained passive with regard to the manufacturer’s 
expectations. Due to their past history, the farmers will require a long time to master 
cooperative work, which is indispensable. The technical and organisational learning 
involved remains incomplete, and this difficult start of operational cooperation 
between actors has not yet produced a durable alliance. However, another question 
remains, can such a situation continue for these individual producers and their 
collectives, subject as they are to the monopoly of just one buyer? 
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